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FROM RESOURCE CONSERVATION TO
SUSTAINABILITY: AN ASSESSMENT OF TWO
DECADES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON
FISHERIES POLICY
Gwenaële Proutière-Maulion*
The European Union (EU) is today the world’s third largest fishing
entity (surpassed only by China and Peru), with over seven million tons of
fish landed in 2001.1  Denmark and Spain, the two main fishing countries
in the EU, land about one million tons of fish annually and employ more
than one-quarter of the sector’s workforce (more than 150,000 persons).2
 Furthermore, the EU fishing fleet had more than 90,000 ships in 2002 and
the number of people employed in its fishing industry (including aqua-
culture, fish processing, marketing, supply, and shipbuilding) in 1997 was
over half a million persons.  The fishing industry is therefore essential for
the socio-economic life of coastal regions in the EU.  Regulating fishing
activity in order to maintain fishery resources at a bio-sustainable level
while at the same time ensuring that fishing continues to be an economi-
cally viable enterprise for coastal populations is a major issue confronting
the European Union, especially in light of the fact that the EU lacks
abundant fishery resources.
The Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union was adopted in
1983,3 although its major principles had been in place since 1970.4
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According to the ideas prevailing at that time, the depletion of fish stocks
necessitated the introduction of a fisheries management system in order to
determine conditions for access to fisheries and the rights to be accorded
to those granted access.  Despite this perceived necessity, EU member
states needed an additional thirteen years to accept a transfer, to the EU,
of their powers regarding the conservation and management of the
resources within waters previously subject to their national jurisdiction.
The EU also needed this time to figure out how to deal with the disruption
of international fisheries law (e.g., the displacement of the traditional
regime of fishing on the high seas with the concept of the Exclusive
Economic Zone) and the impact of EU enlargement to northern European
countries (the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark became EU members
in 1973).  Particular thorny problems related to EU enlargement involved
conflicts concerning access to particular waters, raising questions of
historic rights. 
The development and implementation of a common fisheries policy
was not the result of unanimous agreement on a particular approach.  What
is now regarded as a community asset only came to be so regarded after
ceaseless diplomatic efforts, made necessary by numerous and important
economic and political changes.  At first these efforts were not successful.
The complex and laborious compromises that marked the first two decades
of the Common Fisheries Policy failed to achieve the dual goals of bio-
sustainability and economic viability.  It appears, however, that meaningful
reform finally occurred in 2002, and that the Common Fisheries Policy has
attained a maturity that will allow it to manage effectively the challenges
faced by EU fisheries and the EU fishing industry.
I. THE ABSENCE OF COHERENT REGULATION FROM 1983 TO 1993: FROM
RESOURCE PROTECTION TO CONTROL OF FISHING ACTIVITIES
EU Fisheries regulation measures enacted in 1983 relied principally on
limiting the volume of fish taken by establishing total allowable catches
(TAC) and quotas, in conjunction with technical measures pertaining to
fishing equipment.  Conceived as a policy designed to assure a minimum
income to fishermen as well as allowing a continuous supply of fishery
products to the market, this policy took no account of environmental or
ecosystem factors.  In 1991, a European Commission report to the
European Parliament clearly highlighted these insufficiencies and called
attention to the then-current low level of fish stocks. 
Not only had stock levels not increased, the situation had grown worse
for most species.  Even more worrisome, in light of the growing shortage
of fishery resources, was the fact that the application of TAC and quotas
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5. Council Regulation 3760/92, Establishing a Community System for Fisheries and
Aquaculture, 1992 O.J. (L 389) 1.
had led to an equipment race that generated a substantial overcapacity in
the fishing industry.  In 1991, the EU fleet was oversized in relation to
existing resources, making difficult, if not impossible, the achievement of
the resource management and conservation objectives of Regulation
170/83.  Fishing activity was simply in excess of acceptable exploitation
levels.  In the face of this failure, the 1991 Commission report included a
number of proposals laying out new directions for the Common Fisheries
Policy for the next ten years: implementation of a resource access
regulatory system by means of fishing licenses; introduction of a multi-
year, multi-species TAC system; introduction of segmentation  in structural
policy (in particular in the multi-year general plans that control fleet
evolution in order to better regulate fishery effort in terms of fishing
equipment, ship design, and the establishment and regulation of fishing
zones).   
These proposals were generally followed in Regulation 3760/92 of
1992 that replaced Regulation 170/83, which instituted a community-wide
system for both fishing and aquaculture and established a new system for
management and conservation.5  The aim of the 1992 Regulation was to
establish a system for the management of exploitation activities that would
result in a sustainable equilibrium between resources and the exploitation
of different fishing zones, while at the same time assuring more
coordination between the various aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy.
With these goals in view, the Regulation adopted most of the measures
already contained in the 1983 Regulation (TAC, quotas, technical
measures), but also provided for the possibility that the Council could
establish for each fishery (defined by zone, species, and/or type of ship or
fishing equipment) a limit on exploitation levels based on biological,
technical or socioeconomic considerations.  The Council was also
empowered, on receipt of a proposal from the Commission, to choose to
limit catches by TAC or quotas, or to limit fishing efforts by establishing
a permissible total authorized effort (e.g., by limiting the number of ships
or days at sea).
Regulation 170/83 was only concerned with the conservation of
resources.  Regulation 3760/92, however, went one step further in the
control of fishing activities by providing for the management of exploita-
tion activities.  Nevertheless, despite this evolution, the findings of an
evaluation of fisheries regulation done in 2001 was only marginally better
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6. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament with
Respect to the Application of the Precautionary Principle and the Multi-Year Mechanism
of Fixing the TAC.  COM (2000) 803 final (Jan. 12, 2000).
7. Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy, 9 COM (2001) 135 final
(Mar. 20, 2001).
8. Council Regulation 2908/83, Common Measure for Restructuring and Developing
the Fishing Industry and for Developing Aquaculture, 1983 O.J. (L 290) 1; Council
Regulation 4028/86, Community Measures to Improve and Adapt Structures in the Fisheries
and Aquaculture Sector, 1986 O.J. (L 376) 7.  These were the first measures relative to the
restructuring of the fleet.
than the one done in 1991.6  The period from 1992-2002, which was
expected to introduce and implement multi-year management plans, had
mediocre outcomes and suffered from the same deficiencies as observed in
the prior study.  These deficiencies included overfishing (despite fishing
quotas, which were often understood by fishing industry professionals to
be minimum quantities to be taken rather than as maximum quantities not
to be exceeded), false statements, and excessive discharge.  The new
regulatory tools had not only been misused during the past ten years,7 but
the Council had also persisted, just as it had in the period from 1983-1991,
to systematically establish TACs and quotas in excess of ones suggested to
the Commission on the basis of scientific evidence.  It seems that this
decision-making mechanism was leading inevitably to overexploitation at
the very time when fisheries professionals were raising more and more
questions about the reliability of scientific opinion.  These two
developments cast serious doubt on the utility of TACs and quotas.
Furthermore, the Common Fisheries Policy was faced with obstacles
stemming directly from the diversity of the policies of member states
concerning implementation of EU policies and lack of national
enforcement.  This produced both structural and operational problems.  The
measures put in place to restrain the fishing capacity of the EU fleet so that
it did not exceed a sustainable catch,8 and/or to ensure the enforcement of
the Common Fisheries Policy, produced strong opposition from the fishing
industry and a reluctance on the part of member states, who were concerned
with the integrity of their fishing fleets and with retaining national control
of fishery activities. 
Indeed, in these early years, many difficulties arose in establishing a
collaboration between member states and the Commission.  This situation
encouraged the development of a systemic culture of fraud in compliance
and enforcement.  This development can be explained by both the promise
of high profits in a difficult economic environment and also by feelings of
unfairness occasioned by differing levels of enforcement and sanctions
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9. Council Regulation 2847/93, Establishing a Control System Applicable to the
Common Fisheries Policy, 1993 O.J. (L 261) 1, modified by Council Regulation 2846/98,
Establishing a Control System Applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy, 1998 O.J. (L
358) 5.  The original regulation 2847/93 should have been adopted at the same time as
regulation 3760/92 [see note 5, supra], but strong opposition regarding the establishment
of satellite control of ship activity could only be overcome after some months of
negotiations.
10. See generally, Gwenaële Proutière-Maulion, De la Liberté de Pêche au Droit
d’Exploitation des Ressources:  Bilan et Perspectives de la Politique Commune des Pêches,
14 ANNUAIRE DE DROIT MARITIME ET OCÉANIQUE 133 (1996);Gwenaële Proutière-Maulion,
Une Nouvelle Réforme pour la Politque Commune des Pêches: le Règlement de la Marurité?
DROIT MARITIME FRANCAIS 697 (July-Aug. 2003).
11. Council Regulation 686/97, Establishing a Control System Applicable to the
Common Fisheries Policy, 1997 O.J. (L 102) 1; Commission Regulation 1489/97, Laying
Down Detailed Rules for the Application of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 as
Regards Satellite-Based Vessel Monitoring Systems, 1997 O.J. (L 202).
12. Green Paper, supra note 7; CHRISTIAN LEQUESNE, L’EUROPE BLEUE, À QUOI SERT
UNE POLITIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE DE LA PÊCHE? ( 2001).
which varied from state to state.  The revisions of 19929 sought to establish
an integrated enforcement system for the various aspects of the Common
Fisheries Policy (resources, structures, markets).10  Such a system requires
more enforcement efforts, calling for more expenditures (for satellite-based
vessel monitoring systems, for example), and harsher penalties.11  During
this second decade, surveillance actions remained insufficient according to
the Commission and discriminatory in the opinion of fishermen.  In
addition to the introduction of fishing quotas and the elimination of excess
fleet capacity, efforts to introduce transparency with respect to fishing
activities also contributed to the rejection of the Common Fisheries Policy
by fishermen, who thereby became its weakest link.  
Twenty years after the introduction of the Common Fisheries Policy,
maritime fishing activity in the EU remained characterized by an economic
fragility brought about by overcapitalization and a rapid increase in costs.
These factors, combined with a decrease in fish stock, produced mediocre
profits and constantly declining employment in the industry.12
The failure of the first two general legislative efforts can perhaps be
best explained by the lack of a comprehensive vision combined with the
chronic opposition of fishermen, who feel ignored by the process through
which Common Fisheries Policy is made.  Encouraging cooperative
relations between scientists and the fishermen—who are after all closer to
the economic and social impacts of fisheries policy—would lead to
increased compliance with conservation and management measures by
fishermen.  It is with this end in view that the Common Fisheries Policy
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13. Council Regulation 2371/02, On the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of
Fisheries Resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, 2002 O.J. (L 358).
14. Council Regulation 3760/92, Establishing a Community System for Fisheries and
Aquaculture, 1992 O.J. (L 389) art. II.
15. See generally, Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997.
16. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997 art. 6.  See also art.
174.
17. Communication from  the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:
Fisheries Management and Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment, at 4, COM
(1999) 363 final; Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament—Elements of a Strategy for the Integration of Environmental Protection
Requirements into the Common Fisheries Policy, COM (2001) 143 final.
was modified, for the third time, by the adoption of Regulation
2371/2002.13
II. NEW ORIENTATIONS OF THE COMMON FISHERIES POLICY BY THE
REFORMS OF 2002: FROM RESOURCE CONSERVATION TO
SUSTAINABILITY
Surprisingly, the first two Regulations on the Common Fisheries Policy
did not mention environmental considerations.  Article 2 of Regulation
3760/92, often seen as the legal basis for the integration of demands for
environmental protection into the Common Fisheries Policy, only aspired
to the protection and the conservation of marine resources as a general
goal: to “provide for rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable
basis, in appropriate economic and social conditions for the sector, taking
account of its implications for the marine eco-system . . . . ”14  Not until the
Treaty of Amsterdam would this shortcoming in the Treaty Establishing the
European Community be addressed.15  Article 6 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community now provides: “Environmental protection
requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
the Community policies and activities . . . in particular with a view to
promoting sustainable development.”16
One must recall here an obvious fact about the Common Fisheries
Policy: fishing activity can only have an effect on the fisheries ecosystem
to the extent that fish mortality caused by fishing contributes to the
decrease of marine population levels and to the modification of the
demographic composition of fish populations.17  Similarly, some fishing
techniques may modify the seabed and have a significant impact on benthic
organisms whose habitat is being destroyed or may produce negative
impacts on other species (birds, reptiles, or sea mammals).  These direct
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18. Communication from  the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament:
Fisheries Management and Nature Conservation in the Marine Environment, at 4, COM
(1999) 363 final.
19. Communication from  the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on the Integrated Management of Coastal Zones, COM (1995) 511 final; Communication
from  the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament—Report on the Progress
of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management Demonstration Program, COM (1997) 744
final. 
effects can also produce indirect effects, such as the modification of the
food chain or the risk of pollution.  Thus, sustainability of fishing activity
is dependent on the salubrious operation of the entire ecosystem, which is
also subject to other pressures linked to human activity, like  aquaculture,
tourism, and commercial navigation.  When combined, these activities
aggravate the risk of deterioration of marine ecosystems.
Maintaining fishing activities at an economically sustainable level over
the long-term is therefore impossible without a rational and careful
management program that allows for the protection of all the resources on
which fishing relies.18  The effectiveness of such a program depends, how-
ever, on its compatibility with management of other marine activities.  This
in turn requires that coastal fishing activities be integrated with coastal
zone management in general.19  This integrated view is apparent in Article
2 of Regulation 2371/2002, which provides in part: 
The Common Fisheries Policy shall ensure exploitation of living
aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, environ-
mental and social conditions.  For this purpose, the Community
shall apply the precautionary approach in taking measures designed
to protect and conserve living aquatic resources, to provide for
their sustainable exploitation and to minimize the impact of fishing
activities on marine eco-systems.  It shall aim at a progressive
implementation of an eco-system-based approach to fisheries
management . . . .
Twenty years after the adoption of the first regulation, there is finally
incorporated into the description of marine fisheries the convergence
between fishery resource management and preservation of the marine
environment.  In this way the Common Fisheries Policy has broken with the
traditional stock-by-stock approach and has moved towards an integrated
management scheme that considers not only the interactions between
different stocks, but also the interactions between these stocks and the
marine ecosystem as a whole.
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20. Council Regulation 2371/02, On the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of
Fisheries Resources Under the Common Fisheries Policy, 2002 O.J. (L 358) arts. V, VI.
21. Id. at arts. VII, VIII.
22. Id. at arts. XXIII, XXVIII.
23. Effective January 1, 2005. 
24. Supra note 20 at art. XXV.
25. Council Regulation 1447/99, Establishing a List of Types of Behaviour which
Seriously Infringe the Rules of the Common Fisheries Policy, 1999 O.J. (L 167) 5.
Regulation 2371/2002 introduces new management and resource
preservation measures by providing for the elaboration of multi-year
management and regeneration plans.20  These measures are principally
aimed at the renewal of endangered stocks (regeneration plan) or the
management of fully exploited stocks (management plan).  The purpose of
these plans is to return fish stocks to biologically safe levels or to keep
them there.  These two tools are part of a multi-year approach that acknow-
ledges the new environmental dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy.
In conjunction with these plans, the regulation also allows the Commission
or member states to adopt emergency measures immediately following the
issuance of a “citation.”21
These new arrangements attest to the clear intention of the European
Union to safeguard fish resources in order to protect European fisheries.
This intention goes beyond resource management and can also be seen in
the provisions in Regulation 2371/2002 regarding the adaptability of
fishing capacity to available resources.  Indeed,  in order to benefit from
European Union subsidies, member states will have to exercise real
oversight over their seagoing fleets to assure that they do not exceed
realistic sustainable harvest. 
Finally, Regulation 2371/2002 is the first framework regulation to
include a chapter providing for a community system of monitoring and
enforcement.  It provides that monitoring is the responsibility of the
member state22 and requires the general use of satellite control systems for
ships greater than forty-five feet in length.23  The main thrust of the
enforcement provisions, however, is now aimed at the institution of legal
proceedings.  Member states are encouraged to initiate legal or administra-
tive proceedings against any natural person or legal entity in case of
violation of community regulations.24  The regulation legally compels
member states to take immediate action to in order to prevent further
activity of ships caught in the act of committing serious offenses.25  The
goal of this provision is to harmonize the sanctions of member states for the
most detrimental infractions.  
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26. Supra note 20 at art. XXVI.
27. This power is limited to certain zones and to certain stocks under the specific control
decided by Article 34 of Council Regulation 2847/93, Establishing a Control System
Applicable to the Common Fisheries Policy, 1997 O.J. (L 261).
The Commission has also been given greater powers.  To begin with,
the Commission can take preventive measures for a period of three weeks
when, in its judgment, violations that pose a serious threat to stock
preservation are occurring.26
Moreover, Community inspectors have autonomous powers and can
undertake spot checks on ships and at the point of first landing or first
sale.27  Although fishermen can object to these spot checks and Community
inspectors cannot impose sanctions on the basis of them, data obtained in
these spot checks will provide reliable information to the Commission to
prepare its evaluation report on the enforcement of the Common Fisheries
Policy (which it is required to do every three years).  If the Community
inspection program is really implemented, it might play an important
psychological role, as inspection and surveillance reports prepared by
Community inspectors would constitute judicially admissible evidence as
national statements.
The new framework regulation for the Common Fisheries Policy
strengthens all aspects of fishery resource management policy by perfecting
a unique regulatory tool that was introduced by Regulation 3760/92, i.e., a
comprehensive, integrated policy designed to secure the sustainable
exploitation of fish stocks.  The system is striking in its severity—a clear
demonstration that the Commission has overcome political pressures.  After
failing for twenty years, the Common Fisheries Policy seems to have
reached maturity.
